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INTRODUCTION
In his book Supreme Command, Professor Eliot Cohen coined the term the "Unequal Dialogue" by which he meant the conversation between political leaders and generals that needed to be candid, and sometimes even offensively blunt, yet remained always unequal, or forever resting on the final and unambiguous authority of the political leader. Over the past several decades the purpose, rules, limits, and even legitimacy of the "unequal dialogue" between soldiers and civilians have been challenged. Some critics have accused civilians of ignoring military advice. Others have accused the military of not rendering candid advice--of being "yes men." Still others have argued that generals should have professional autonomy or a virtual veto over certain decisions that affect the military.
Unequal relations and communications are an inherent fact of military life, so why have "unequal dialogues" between politicians and soldiers produced so much conflict and confusion? This paper will argue that the "unequal dialogue" is not simply a peculiar characteristic of civilmilitary relations, but a central feature of the military's professional ethic. Furthermore, the principles and practices, the obligations and limitations of the professional dialogue within the military apply directly to how we engage with both political leaders and the larger society.
In exploring this subject, I will first explain Professor Cohen's concept of the "unequal dialogue" and how it also applies to the unequal dialogue within the military professional. I will then make use of some recent examples, primarily related to Iraq surge decision-making process, to illustrate some of the ethical aspects in both the civil-military and internal military dialogue.
Finally, I will suggest some basic, though by no means comprehensive, principles for the various "unequal dialogues" of the military professional.
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Two Dialogues
Before I begin my analysis, let me begin with two illustrative examples of unequal dialogues.
In the years after the invasion of Iraq, Colin Powell has described how he spent two and a half hours attempting to talk President Bush out of the decision to invade. Yet, in his book, Plan of Attack, Bob Woodward"s more contemporaneous account suggests something more complicated. According to Woodward, Powell, "the "Reluctant Warrior" was urging restraint, but he had not tossed his heart on the table." "He had not said, "Don"t do it."" Woodward goes on to explain that in his years in the military, Powell, "had learned to play the boss and talk only within the confines of the preliminary goals set by the boss." Either Powell or Woodward concludes, "Perhaps he had been too timid." In recounting George Bush"s memory of the meeting, Woodward describes how the president believed that Powell was talking about tactics, the difficulties and the need for allies, rather than the strategy and the decision to go to war. 2 In his book, Vietnam at War, Phillip Davidson describes how in 1954 before the ill-fated operation at Dienbienphu, the battlefield commander, General René Cogny began to have doubts about the operation that he himself had originally proposed. Rather than send to General Henri Navarre, the theater commander, the hard-hitting analysis written by his staff, Cogny delivered a more careful, equivocal memorandum. This memo raised some of the problems, but did not 1 Two cautions. I am a historian and a former military officer, not an ethicist. My approach to the Professional Military Ethic (PME) will be more discursive and illustrative rather than systematic. In addition, I will be using examples primarily from published, but largely journalistic sources. In writing the "first draft" history, journalists do not generally have the advantages of voluminous written documents, multiple personal memoirs and reflections, and the perspective of history. I do not claim that these stories are true in all their particulars. However, I believe them sufficiently representative to illustrate the question of the unequal professional dialogue. 2 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, seriously challenge the wisdom of the operation. Apparently, Cogny"s staff sneered at their boss"s "straddle." The book's author, a retired U.S. Army major general, shrewdly observed that staff officers are usually "blunter and bolder" than their principals because they stand protected behind their leader and will not directly bear the repercussions of an unwelcome recommendation or failure.
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I think these two brief examples capture some of the complexities of the "unequal dialogue." Whether advising civilian or military superiors, it is very difficult for military officers to challenge the boss, especially on his objectives. However, such indirect methods such as "playing the boss" or "straddling" does not achieve the candor or clarity needed when vital matters are at stake. One can also sense that both Powell and Cogny were hampered by their own doubts and uncertainties. On the other hand, we can contrast their hesitation and diffidence with the confidence and conviction of staff officers. Of special significance for the formulation of strategy, is the willingness of military officers to question objectives issued by superiors. This goes against most of their experience and training. One normally regards the objectives issued by higher headquarters as fixed and it is the ways and the means that are in play. Yet, if strategy is about balancing ends, ways, and means, then the suitability or affordability of the ends must be considered. Thus, a subordinate must sometimes challenge the value of the objectives.
COHEN'S "UNEQUAL DIALOGUE"
With that preamble, let me turn to Eliot Cohen's concept of the "Unequal Dialogue." In his book, Professor Cohen advocated an aggressive and sometimes intrusive role for civilian leaders in the planning and conduct of war. While acknowledging that a political leader seldom directly disregards military advice, Cohen observed "a politician finds himself managing military 3 Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History 1946 -1975 alliances, deciding the nature of acceptable risk, shaping operational choices, and reconstructing military organizations." 4 There are three principal reasons for this "selective meddling." First, war is profoundly political. Hence, political leaders are often more experienced or more qualified to make political assessments, and ultimately they are the ones politically accountable for the decisions. The second reason for active or intrusive involvement in military issues is because generals and admirals frequently disagree. The political leader must sometimes arbitrate these disagreements.
He must ultimately decide which course of action is best. The final reason Cohen offers is that the senior officer may not be the best advisor for the specific circumstances or the particular war.
Military officers are shaped by their training and experiences. The qualities needed for peacetime generalship may not fully transfer to war. Cohen also observed that military experience is often highly specific and conditional. An officer's experience in a certain kind or war does not necessarily translate into expertise in another type of warfare. Thus, a primary duty of the political leader is to select the proper military leaders.
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While Cohen stresses the unequal nature of the dialogue, he also embraces the mutually candid and occasionally sharp character of the dialogue. The building of trust and confidence between civilian and military leaders cannot rely on formalities and false comity. As Cohen observed, "A bland pleasantness in civil-military relations may also mean civilians are evading their responsibilities or that soldiers have succumbed to the courtier mentality rather than that true harmony exists." The "Normal" Theory of Civil-Military Relations 4 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, 208, 10. 5 However, I submit that the moment the military became self-consciously professional they embraced what is really a claim to professional jurisdiction.
It is in the nature of professions to establish jurisdictional boundaries; to claim, "This is my area of responsibility and authority." As Cohen and many other commentators on Huntington's theory contend, the basic problem with this division of labor is that in the real world political and military domains are very blurred and the boundary, to the extent that one is ever agreed upon, is constantly changing. While especially true at the strategic level, we have seen that the spheres blur at the operational and tactical levels as well.
While it is not surprising that many military professionals prefer these separate spheres of authority, many politicians also embrace this jurisdictional boundary. tends to ignore both the diversity and ambiguity of the internal debates. It also glosses over the extent to which some of the military "dissent" seems to have involved objections to the political objectives which were well beyond the purview of the military. I agree with Peter Fever"s assessment that the problems in Iraq were not the result of inadequate political "deference to military experts," nor the "dereliction of generals in not more forcefully thwarting civilian leaders," but to mutual civilian and military mistakes and misjudgments. doctrinally and temperamentally ill-prepared.
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The Unequal Professional Dialogue
My purpose is not the review the decisions to invade Iraq, to reiterate Cohen"s rationale for the "unequal dialogue: war is political, generals disagree, and military experience is not always relevant to the current situation. Moreover, I argue that these factors also apply to the "unequal dialogue" within the military profession. Politics not only dominates strategy, it pervades nearly all aspects of war, especially irregular war. Just as generals often disagree when offering military advice to political leaders, within professional circles generals (and colonels, captains, and sergeants) often disagree. Finally, military expertise and experience are often highly specific and no officer can be an expert in everything aspect of the profession.
The political dimension of the military profession is too often ignored. Most military officers express distaste for politics and pretend that it can be separated from military life. Yet, politics not only permeates war it permeates everything. Politics, broadly defined, is how organizations make decisions. In rejecting politics, most officers mean party politics that seeks special or partisan advantage at the expense of "the public good." There is a certain cognitive dissonance when officers reject the messiness of politics, yet intrinsically know that interests and where even professionals will disagree on the nature and definition of the problem. And thus, there must be extensive dialogue and debate on defining the problem before ever considering to solutions. 
UNEQUAL DIALOGUES FROM THE IRAQ "SURGE"
The Iraq "surge" decision is a distinctive event in the history of civil-military relations.
In Moreover, understanding how national security decisions are made when military experts disagree is a central question of the "unequal civil-military dialogue." These episodes also provide grist for the consideration of the unequal professional dialogue.
The Iraq Study Group
The bipartisan study commission is hardy perennial in American government. It has been a very common form of civil-military dialogue. For example, in the nineteen century, Congress, either directly or indirectly through the executive department-lead commissions, would undertake broad studies of military or security policy--notably on Indian policy and coastal defense. Commonly, all of the generals of the army would be asked to provide their opinions. The President and the JCS.
Two days after meeting with the outside experts, President Bush came to the Pentagon to hear the views of the JCS. Again according to Bob Woodward, the president came armed with "sweeteners" including a promise to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps. As the president pressed them on what could be done to improve the security situation in Iraq, the JCS first urged that the president get commitments of action and support from Prime Minister
Malicki. Regarding a surge of up five brigades, they warned that this constituted the nation's strategic reserve and that the military would be unable to readily respond to a crisis elsewhere.
The president indicated that he was more concerned about the current war than a hypothetical one. likely to break the force, a humiliating defeat or sustaining the surge over the next few years. The Chiefs acknowledged that defeat would be more damaging. 24 At one point, the army chief opined that generating the surge force would take time and expressed doubt that the president had the time, meaning the political time. There are several versions of the president response, but essentially the president indicated that in his political assessment, he had the time. Although the president had told them he had not yet made his decision, Woodward concludes that the joint chiefs had "sniffed him out." The president favored a surge.
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If General Schoomaker's intrusion into the political sphere was a breach of protocol, I
submit it was a minor one. The question of the political time necessary to conduct the surge was not a trivial matter. That the army chief raised the concern showed he had some sense of the political pressure under which the Commander in Chief was working. Moreover, Schoomaker, in bringing up the issue, did not insist that his political judgment was superior to the president's. 27 Feaver, "The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Surge," 35-6. Tom Ricks suggests that Pace took a somewhat hands-off approach to Iraq because he could focus on the rest of the world, while two four stars were "on the case" in Iraq. Ricks, The Gamble, 88. 28 Bob Woodward, The War Within, 310, 306. Casey greeted Keane and inquired if the Chairman of the JCS had called him yet. Keane responded no and asked why. Casey replied: "Because we feel --the chiefs feel --that you are way too out in front advocating a policy for which you're not accountable. We're accountable.
You're not accountable, Jack. And that's a problem." Keane responded the he was as a member of the Secretary Defense Policy Board he was supposed the offer independent advice and all he was trying to do was help Petraeus. Unlike others, he had supported the Abizaid/Casey strategy for years. "And at some point, I no longer could support it. I'm not operating as some kind of Lone Ranger." Casey reiterated, "It's not appropriate for a retired general to be so far forward advocating a policy that he is not responsible or accountable for." Keane did not agree.
29
Later, Keane, again according to Bob Woodward, had "heard through the Pentagon grapevine" that the new JCS Chairman, ADM Mike Mullen, "had told colleagues that one of his first plans was to "get Keane back in the box." Keane went to see the chairman. In the meeting Mullen told Keane, "I don't want you going to Iraq anymore and helping Petraeus." "You've diminished the office of the chairman of the Joint Chief." Eventually getting the heart of the issue, Keane remarked that, "to the degree that you're putting pressure on Petraeus to reduce forces, you're taking far too much risk, and that risk is in losing and not winning. 
Pervasiveness of Politics
So what do these stories tell us about "unequal dialogues" and the professional military ethic? One of the first implications is the pervasiveness of politics. As I stated earlier, politics is about how groups make decisions and thus it is endemic to the military profession. All officers swim in some kind of political pond, lake, or ocean. Whether conducting stability operations, contingency planning, or systems acquisition, there is a political dimension to the job. Political any other political appointment, our professional status and credibility will be destroyed.
Administrations will demand personal and political loyalty and incoming administrations will remove incumbent generals to make way for their own "loyalists." Just as federal prosecutors are routinely replaced at the Department of Justice and judges must pass through political filters, the selection and promotion of generals could become overtly political.
Candor and Civility
My chief disappointment about the so-called "revolt of the generals" in 2006 was that it became too personal, too simplistic, too partisan. It obscured or ignored the tremendous complexities and difficulties decision-makers faced. The generals presented one-sided philippics rather a reasoned analysis. I also believe that the transparency, and accountability, of the professional dialogue requires that most of it be on the record. Of course, there are times when some things should not go on the record such as when General Pace asked Keane of his opinion on Pace's performance.
However as a historian, I am a frustrated, and a bit appalled, at the amount of political-military decision-making that is being conducted with no record. As useful as Bob Woodward can be, I
would much rather have the minutes of the NSC meetings than the filtered memories of selfinterested participants. After all, are we not all the heroes of our own stories and thus selectively recall events from our own perspective.
There is also something to be said for formalized bureaucratic processes. I recall listening to a speech by a former JCS J-5 who took Defense Under Secretary Richard Armitage to task for "short circuiting" the policy process by inviting J-5 staffers to participant in OSD working group meetings. The general's point was that these staff officers could not and did not represent the views of the JCS, because the JCS had not yet considered the issue or formulated recommendations. Jack Keane"s back channel efforts give me similar concern. Yet, Keane did not invent this situation. I regret that modern decision-makers are leaving fewer and fewer fingerprints and that there will enormous gaps in the record of our national security and the military decision-making process. This is bad for accountability and transparency.
Many old hands, wise in the ways of bureaucracy, will regard my appeal for transparency as naïve. There is some justice to this charge. After all, the control and manipulation of information has been with us since scribes first put styli to clay tablets. Our competitive culture, and especially our adversary legal system, constantly reinforces that idea there are winners and losers. Military professionals are probably more competitive than most; losing an argument is nearly as unbearable as losing a war. But ethical principles and codes are not based on the lowest plane of practice, but the higher reaches of our ideals. Moreover, many military values--obedience, collectivism, readiness to kill--frequently conflict with the values of the larger society. Our insistence on transparent and fair-minded professional dialogue may not be always reciprocated, but I that should not stop us a adhering to our own professional values. In the long run, I believe it will breed trust.
Private and Public Dialogue
A transparent dialogue can be both public and private. One of the striking aspects of the surge dialogue was the relative absence of leaking by the various participants. While there was some contemporary reporting and participants were surely leaking to Bob Woodward, there was no damaging battle of leak and counter leak that had marred earlier strategic debates. The public deliberation generated by the ISG process may have provided cover for the private, internal They can be equally reassured by the intellectual energy displayed in forging new expert knowledge and skills. The "surge" would not have been successful without both the hard-won combat experience and creative professionalism of the American military.
Humility and Trust
In conclusion, I would like to make one final point about the unequal civil-military dialogue and the unequal professional dialogue. They both require humility. Experts need to
teach, yet professionals must continuously learn. Military expertise can never be taken for granted and it is not simply the product of experience. The military profession will always face new and different challenges that require new solutions and the forging of new areas of expertise.
A professional should never fear testing, proving, improving that expertise. As much as we might lament it, we do not possess a monopoly on national security knowledge or expertise. We must expect to be constantly challenged by other national security experts and political leaders.
If professional expertise is the product of lifelong learning, then a military professional should value learning from others. Challenging professional dialogues and debates are as important in professional fitness as physical training. All leaders--civilian and military, senior and junior--benefit from such encounters.
Finally, the military profession depends on trust. Trust is the central civil-military relationship and the fundamental bond among soldiers. Trust begins with a shared commitment to service. It requires mutual respect and understanding. Society does not grant the military discretionary authority without trust and the military does not delegate authority without trust.
Bias or partisanship taints professional expertise and advice and undermines trust. Any meaningful and candid unequal dialogue ultimately depends on trust.
